CLERK'S OFFICE U.S. DIST. COURT AT CHARLC ITESVILE, VA

JAN 0 8 2021

JULIA G. OLIVEY CLERK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA Charlottesville Division

GREGORY CONTE AND WARREN BALOGH,

Plaintiffs,

V.

Civil Action No. 3:20-cv-00038

COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA AND TERENCE R. MCAULIFFE AND VIRGINIA STATE POLICE AND STEVEN FLAHERTY AND BRIAN JOSEPH MORAN AND BECKY CRANNIS-CURL AND CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE AND MICHAEL SIGNER AND WES BELLAMY AND CHARLOTTESVILLE POLICE DEPARTMENT AND AL THOMAS, JR.,

Defendants.

PLAINTIFFS' MOTION FOR THE RECUSAL OF JUDGE NORMAN MOON.

COME NOW plaintiffs Conte and Balogh and move that Judge Norman Moon recuse himself from this action. Judge Moon has, in other cases related to Unite the Right, exhibited clear and consistent prejudice against litigants and defendants who have come before This Court. Under such circumstances, plaintiffs cannot reasonably expect to receive a fair adjudication of their claim.

In Kessler v. City of Charlottesville, Judge Moon failed to recuse himself, despite the fact that two of his clerks Joshua Lefebvre and Hutton Marshall were close friends of the plaintiffs, and Lefebvre have been a material witness to facts alleged (see Case 3:19-cv-00044-NKM-JCH, Document 55 "Motion for Recusal"). It was only after plaintiff Kessler published information about Marshall's and LeFebvre's potential conflicts that Judge Moon issued an order, removing the two compromised clerks from the case. However, he did not recuse himself from that case, nor did he reveal, or endeavor to discover, their obvious and dangerous conflict of interest *until* plaintiff Kessler brought it to the attention of the public-

and the court. Judge Moon's failure to recuse himself in that case was a clear violation of federal regulations, and judicial precedent.¹

Plaintiffs have already raised this issue in our response to the Defendants' motions to dismiss regarding the proper venue for this case (cf. Document 35, "PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE IN OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANTS' RULE 12(b)(3) MOTIONS TO DISMISS OR TRANSFER VENUE"). Despite our objections, we have received no explanation for the decision to assign our case to Judge Moon's docket.

Public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary involving a civil rights case with profound implications relating to the future duties and responsibilities of government officials in upholding the rights of political dissidents, demands the impartiality of an independent and honorable judiciary. The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and personal conduct of a judge and his assistants. The conduct of Judge Moon's court has created, in reasonable minds, a perception that the judge's ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity and impartiality in this case is impaired. Behaving with impropriety or the appearance of impropriety in the professional and personal conduct of a judge and/or his assistants is prohibited. We therefore request that the Court decide the present motion prior to making any other decisions in this case and respectfully request that Judge Moon recuse himself or that our case be assigned to a different judge.

¹ See 28 U.S.C. § 455(a). the judge of this Court should also be disqualified because he has at least a professional, and likely personal, relationship with political officials and social networks that could be substantially affected by the outcome of this case. See id. at § 455(b)(4). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), any judge or magistrate judge "shall disqualify himself in any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." The standard under § 455(a) is not subjective; it requires the Court to ask "whether an objective, disinterested, lay observer fully informed of the facts underlying the grounds on which recusal was sought would entertain a significant doubt about the judge's impartiality." McWhorter v. City of Birmingham, 906 F.2d 674, 678 (11th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted). Thus, under § 455(a), "what matters is not the reality of bias or prejudice but its appearance," and "quite simply and quite universally, recusal [is] required whenever 'impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540, 548 (1994) (citation omitted). Close questions as to the appearance of impropriety are to be decided in favor of recusal. See United States v. Kelly, 888 F.2d 732, 744 (11th Cir. 1989).

Dated: January 7, 2021

Respectfully Submitted,

P.O. Box 3874 Gaithersburg, MD 20885

WARREN BALOGH, pro se

P.O. Box 6037 Pittsburgh, PA 15211

CERTIFICATE

I hereby certify that on the 7th of January 2021, I sent the foregoing to the Clerk of the Court by first class mail.

I hereby certify that I have mailed by United States Postal Service the document to the following:

Erin R. McNeill, Esq. (VSB No. 78816) Robert B. McEntee, III, Esq. (VSB No. 89390) Madeline M. Gibson, Esq. (VSB No. 87561) Office of the Virginia Attorney General 202 North 9th Street Richmond, VA 23219

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Dated January 7, 2021.

Respectfully Submitted,

Gregory Conte

/Warren Balogh